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1.  The:'Shaping  of  the  EC's  Development  Policy 
The  Community's  development  cooperation  pol icy  took  shape  after  the 
1972  Paris  Summit  of  the  nine  heads  of  state  and  government,  which 
gave  it  an  overall  mandate  in  that  area. 
The  Community's  development  approach  concentrated  at  first  on 
neighbouring  developing  countries  but  soon  moved  into  the  world 
wide  arena. 
flits  main  chapters  are:  the  adoption  of  the  GSP  (1971),  the  3  billion 
dollars  emergency  fund  for  the  MSA  countries  (1974)  the  start  of  the 
Euro-Arab  dialogue  (1974);  the  signing  of  the  two  Lome  Conventions 
(1975,1980),  the  signing  of  cooperation  agreements  with  Israel,  the 
Maghreb  (Algeria,  Morocco,  Tunisia)  and  Mashreq  (Egypt,  Syria,  Jordan, 
Lebanon)  agreements  (1975-1977),  trade  cooperation  agreements  with 
India  (1973),  Mexico  (1975)  and  Brazil  (1980),  the  cooperation  agree-
ments  with  The  ASEAN  countries  (1979),  the  signing  of  the  World  Food 
Convention  (the  EC  provides  US  $600  million  food  aid  worth  annually), 
and  the  programme  of  aid  for  non-associated  countries  (which  started 
in  1976  and  reached  an  annual  figure of  $190  million  in  1980). 
Today,  the  Community  alone 
commits  some  US  $2.5  billion  in  ODA  (of  which  1.2  billion  is  con-
tributed  by  the  Member  States  for  Lome),  which  amounts  to  about  20% 
of  total  ODA  commitments  by  the  EC  and  its  nine  governments. 
The  latter  t.ogether  contribute  39%  of  total  ODA  (U.S.  16%  (1))  and  0.5% 
of  their  GNP  (U.S.  0.2%).  Overseas  aid  is  the  fifth highest  item 
in the  EC  bud~et. 
(1)  i.e.  less  than  the  Arab  oil  exporting  countries,  and  just  four  times 
the  tiny  Kuwait  (all  above  are  1979  figs.  from  the  World  Devpt.  Reports 
and  EC  Commission.) Page  2. 
By  1976,  the  record  was  such  that  the 
Tri later9l  Commission  concluded  a  study  on international  institutional 
;': 
reform'by  stating  that  the  European  initiatives 
11are  the  most  effect-
i ve  route  on  issues  concerning  North-South  relationshio. 
2.  The  Lome  Convention 
2.1  Content 
.~  f  The  p1ece  de  resistance  o  the  Community 1s  regional  approach  to  the 
Third  World  is  the  Lome  agreement.  The  Trilateral  Commission  defined 
,.  it  11 a  political  event  of  international  significance11,  It  is  a  five 
year  renewable  global  contract  binding  together  a  Community  of  Ni~e 
(soon  Ten)  industrial  countries  and  an  increasingly  integrated  group 
of  sixty  developing  countries  in  Africa,  The  Caribbean  and  The 
Pacific  (ACP).  representing  all  together  more  than  500  million 
people. 
Lome
1 s  main  features  are: 
- Free  market  access,  without  reciprocity,  to  the  ECM  for  99.5% 
of  the  goods  exported  from  the  ACP  and  originating  in  these 
countries. 
-The  right  to  financial  compensation  (mostly  on  a  grant  basis) 
when  any  of  43  agricultural  exports  (plus  iron  ore,  temporarily) 
of  the  ACP  to  the  ECM.  provide  foreign  exchange  earnings  falling 
below  prescribed  reference  levels.  The  relevant  system,  called 
STABEX
1 differs  from  a  compensatory  financing  mechanism  in  so  far 
as  it  is  a  trade  mechanism,  on  a  product  by  product  basis  (and 
not  on  a  balance-of-payments  basis). Page  3. 
An  acc,ident  insurance  scheme  for  six  minerals  (or  groups  thereof) 
called  SYSMIN,  whose  aim  is  the  safeguarding  of  the  existing 
mining  potential.  When  natural  disasters,  grave  political  events 
or  economic  factors  (price  col lapse)  cause  a  substantial  (  >  10%) 
fa! 1  in  the  production  or  export  capacity  of  any  of  the  six  minerals 
by  an  ACP  country,  the  Community  is  committed  to  make  a  special 
(1%  interest  - 10  years  of  grace,  40  years  amortization)  Joan  to 
reestablish  the  original  mining  conditions. 
-A  commodity  agreement  on  raw  sugar,  according  to  which  the  ACP  and  , 
the  EC  commit  themselves  to  respectively  sell  and  buy  1.4  million 
tons  of  sugar  at  prices  close. to  the  Community•s  domestic  sugar 
prices  (quasi-indexation). 
Industrial  and  technological  cooperation,  which  can  benefit  from  a 
jointly-managed  Centre  for  Industrial  Development,  aimed  at  promot-
ing  a  better  international  division  of  labour  on  1 ines  advantageous 
to  the  ACP.  A  reinforced  trade  consultation  mechanism  aims  at 
providing  mutually  greater  transparance  of  market  prospects,  notably 
on  sensitive  sectors  or  product  groups. 
Investments  promotion  and  protection  provisions  according  to  which 
any  Investment  agreements  entered  Into  by  an  EC  member  with  an  ACP 
country  must  be  extended  to  other  EC  members  asking  for  it  and 
ready  to  subscribe  to  the  same  obligations. 
Moreover,  specific  agreements  with  rights  and  obligations  may  be 
sought  by  governments  and  fl rms  concerning  energy  or  mining  projects. 
- Cooperation  in  the  area  of  agriculture- for  which  a  jointly-managed 
technical  C~ntre  for  Agricultural  and  Rural  Cooperation  has  been 
set  up. ' 
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-A  fram~'work  for  bilateral  fishery  agreements  in  which  the  Community 
provides  concessions  in  exchange  for  fishing  rights  (several  such 
agreements  have  already  been  signed),  and  increased  coordination 
as  regards  conservation  and  uti 1 ization  of  fishery  resources. 
- Cooperation  in  sea  transport. 
- Reciprocal  undertakings  to  guarantee  to  the  nationals  of  any  of 
the  signatories  of  the  Convention  residing  legally  in  any  signatory 
state  the  same  working  conditions,  pay  and  jo~-related  social 
security  benefits  as  nationals  of  that  state. 
-Financial  and  technical  assistance  amounting  to  EUA  5,227  mil 1 ion 
(equivalent  to  US  $7,500  mill !on)  for  the  duration  of  the  Convention, 
of  which  some  80%  are  in  the  form  of  grants  and  the  rest  is  con-
cessional  assistance.  This  includes  EUA  600  million  for  regional 
aid,  EUA  200  million  for  emergency  aid,  EUA  550  million  for  the 
STABEX,  EUA  280  million  for  the  SYSMIN,  EUA  685  million  in  loans 
from  the  European  Investment  Banks.  It  excludes  up  to  EUA  200 
million  that  the  EIB  is  committed  to  make  available  for  projects 
of  mutual  interest  in  mining  and  energy  in  the  ACP. 
- Common  Institutions.  The  administration  of  the  Convention  is  the 
responsibi 1 ity  of  the  ACP-EC  Council  of  Ministers  assisted  by  a 
Joint  Committee  of  Ambassadors.  An  ACP-EC  Consultative  Assembly  -
composed  on  a  basis  of  parity  of  members  of  the  European  Parliament 
and  of  representatives  designated  by  the  ACP,  holds  periodical 
meetings  with  the  aim  to  provide  political  impulse  and  advice  to  the 
ACP-EC  Council  (other  common  institutions  have  been  mentioned  above.) Page  5. 
2.2.  Sigoificance  -. 
Lome  does  not  represent  a  pilot  scheme- as  some  have  said  -but  a 
new  model  of  international  relations.  Its  main  innovations  are 
relevant  to  the  discussions  on  a  NIEO: 
l.  The  establishment  of  stable  contractual  relations  between 
groups  of  countries, thereby  enhancing  regional  cohesion. 
2.  The  joing  management  of  these  relations  on  the  basis  of 
ad  hoc  institutions,  so  as  to  ensure  a  better  respect  of  the 
sovereignity  of  the  weakest,  i.e.  reduce  the  risk  of  inter-
ference. 
3.  A  global  approach,  which  c~nsists  in  a  package  of  different 
measures  and  responses  to  the  specific  needs  of  individual 
partner  countries. 
4.  Free  market  access  for  poor  LDCs  without  reciprocity  (the  LDC 
oartners  may  favour  imports  from  other  LDCs  over  those  from 
the  EC;  LDC 1s  are  exempted  from  cumulative  rules  of  origin). 
5.  Recognition  that  the  free  play  of  market  forces  is  imperfect, 
which  may  require  guaranteeing  a  minimum  income  (Stabex) ' 
or  indexing  it  (case of  poor  Commodity  producers)  or  resort  to 
subsidization  (Sysmin). 
6.  Redistribution  of  resources  to  LDCs  on  the  basis  of  firmly 
committed  amounts  over  multi-year  periods  and  with  flexible 
procedures. 
3.  The  EC
1 s  Mediterannean  Policy 
The  Paris  Summit  of  1972  pronounced  itself  in  favour  of  an  overall 
Mediterannean  policy  of  the  EC.  This  became  a  reality  in  the  mid-
seventies.  The  pol icy  has  been  agreed  with  seven  Arab  coastal  states Page  6. 
an d  I s ra.e 1 .  The  agreements  are  al 1  global  cooperation  agreements 
of  the  Lome  type. 
The  main  differences  with  respect  to  Lome  are: 
a)  on  the  negative  side:  mo. r e  1 i m  i t e d  a c c e s s  to  t he  E  C  M  , 
the  lack  of  a  STABEX  or  SYSMIN  system  or  of  any  arrange-
ment  along  the  1 ines  of  the  Lome  sugar  agreement  and 
smaller  amounts  of  aid  (about  US$  l  billion  for  five 
years  up  to  1981).  Moreover, 
11 reverse  preferences
11 
exist with  Israel,  and  the mutual  1 iberal ization of  trade 
remains  the  ultimate  objective  with  the  other  partners 
a 1 so. 
b)  on  the  positive  side:  unlimited  duration  -which  notably 
means  free  access  to  the  ECM  for  an  unlimited  period 
(whereas  the  finance  aid  protocols  need  periodical  renewal). 
These  agreements  were  also  the  first  to  include  clauses  on 
social  security  for  migrant  workers  moving  to  the  EC  and 
provisions  for  cooperation  in  relation  to  energy  supply 
which  have  both  extended  to  the  Lome  partners  since. 
Also  Yugoslavia  has  received  EC  mediterannean  treatment 
including  financial  assistance  through  the  European  Invest-
ment  Bank. 
The  reasons  of  the  differences  between  the  mediterannean  agreements 
and  Lome  are  their  greater  geographic  proximity  and  greater economic 
strength  and  competitiveness  (compared  to  those  of  the  ACP). 
The  very  ambivalence  of  the  Community
1 s  position  as  competitor  and Page  7. 
at  the  s9me  time  privileged  partner  of  its  mediterannean  .. 
neighbours  has  indeed  been  at  the  root  of  the  difficulties  long 
standing  in  the  way  of  a  coherent  Community  policy  in  the area. 
The  enlargement  of  the  EC  towards  the  European  south  is  compounding 
the  existing  problems,  notably  by  making  the  enlarged  Community 
of  twelve  self•sufficient  for  a  number  of  mediteranean  agricultural 
products  and  aggravating  its  surplus  in  some  manufacturing  sectors 
such  as  text i I es  and  shoes. 
~The signing  of  the  EC-Mediterranean  agreements  is  an  important  step 
by  these  partners  towards  taking  greater  responsibilities  in  the 
area.  As  obviously  the  EC  cannot  employ  power  politics  in  the 
mediterranean,  its  fundamental  aim  is  to  create  a  new  economic 
balance  among  mediterranean  states  so  that  it  can  develop  into  an 
area  of  peace  and  prosperity. 
4.  Wider  Implications 
Lome  is  a  step  towards  reshaping  the  present  international  disorder  and 
a  proof  of  the  latter's  existence.  Its  not  an  answer  to  alI  problems. 
Its  background  has  international  dimensions:increasing  misery,  notably 
food  deficits,  deteriorating  terms  of  trade  and  mounting  indebtedness 
for  the  LDCs;  the  lack  of  a  dialogue  between  oil  consumers  and 
producers  as  well  as  between  developed  and  developing  countries. 
It  appears  inevitable  that  all  elements  of  a  N-S  dialogu~ which  are 
interdependent,  wil I  have  to  be  discussed  within  a  global  framework. 
A greater  coherence  is  necessary  if  we  ask  the  oil  producers  to Page  8. 
ensure  t}ie  forecastability  of  oil  supplies  and  prices,  we  cannot 
refuse  to  do  the  same  for  wheat  and  cocoa.  If  we  want  a  dialogue 
with  the  oi 1  producers,  we  must  be  ready  to  discuss  the  conditions 
of  their  investments  abroad,  i.e.  international  monetary  refom. 
The  increasing  interdependence  among  nations  (through  international 
trade  and  capital  movements)  has  led  to  a  situation  in  which  the 
international  system  can  no  longer  be  effectively  regulated without  a 
strengthening of appropriate decision-making  powers. 
,. 
In  this  connection  recent  experience  has  proved  that  there  is  scope 
for  action  at  all  levels,  interflational,  inter-regional  as  well  as 
inter-regional,  these  levels  being  open  to  overlaps. 
Collective  management  of  the  world  economy  can  actually  take  many 
forms  which,  despite  conflicts,  may  virtually  reinforce  each  other 
towards  the  objective  of a  new  stable  and  growing  international 
economy. 
Bold  steps  in  some  areas  by  some  (e.g.  LOME),  can  stimulate advances  in 
~ther areas,  or  create  new  decision-making  structurPs  that 
may  change  the  ball  game  entirely.  The  ECM  proved  this  in  the 
•' 
trade  area  (Kennedy  Round).  The  European  Monetary  System  - phase  I I 
may  prove  it  in  the  monetary.-al'ea. Page  9. 
In  fact, the  very  existence of  the  E.C.  demonstrates  that  it  is  ,, 
,,~,.· 
possible  to establish  rules  and  institutions  that are capable of 
strengthening  the  decision-making  process  beyond  the  national 
level  among  increasingly organized  and  interdependent  regional  (or 
functional:  OPEC)  groupings. 
There  is  indeed ample  evidence  that  regional  groupings  can  encourage 
a  global  but  pragmat1c  approach  to  international  relations,  away 
from  the  rethoric of  extremes  which  often  characterizes  bloc  to 
bloc  (East  against West,  Group  B against  G.77)  and  nation  to  nation 
relations. 
B  1  ocs  can  thus  be  replaced  by  rrosaics  which  may  require  patience 
to  be  dealt with,  rather  than  brute force. 
Regional  groupings  should  normally  be  less  inclined  than  nations, 
at  some  stages  of  their history,  to  take messianic  approaches  and 
therefore  to  identify heretics,  to  believe  in  churches  and  devils, 
to  be  drawn  into  mass  phenomena  1 ike  fascism,  Stalinism or 
McCarthysm. 
The  seventies,  it seems  to me,  have  indicated  that  a  certain division 
of  responsabilities  has  appeared  in  the West,  with  the  U.S.  caring 
primarily  about  Western  Security and  Europe  caring  primarily  for 
development  cooperation  (not military aid)  with  the  poorest  countries. 
This  does  of  course  not  mean  that  the  U.S.  are  not  in  the aid 
busi~ess,  nor  that  the  Europeans  are out of  the  security  business 
(see  their participation  in  the  Helsinki  and  Belgrade  security 
conferences).  Besides,  the  borders  between  the  two  areas  have Page  10. 
i'  . ·have  become  blurred  in times  of  economic  warfare for  political 
:~' 
motives.  International  conflicts are  indeed  fed  by  widening 
disparity of  income,  which  leads  to  resource cartels,  block 
voting  at  the  U.N.,  economic  warfare  and  other  forms  of 
11militantism''· 
An  example  of  the  increasing overlap  between  "high-politics" and 
"low-politics"  is  the  Palestinian  question.  The  abstention of  the 
E.C.  on  the  Pro-Palestinian  resolution  in  the  U.N.  General  Assembly 
last July,  rather  than  a  move  antagonizing  its greatest ally 
the  U.S.,  reflects  the  hope  to  play  "a  middleman"  role  in  the 
Middle  East  conflict  by  showing  evenhandedness  in  this matter. 
It also  reflects  the  belief that without  peace  in  that  area,  no 
deal  can  be  made  with  the  LDC's  on  major  international  economic 
issues. 
In  spite of  its  internal  differences,  Europe  basically  needs  and 
wants  a  meaningful  North-South  Dialogue.  So  do  most  other countries. 
It  is  therefore vital  that  the  U.S.  join  in,  or  they will  face 
tensions  with  their  industrialized  partners. 
I  believe  that  Europe  increasingly  understands  the  influence  it cah 
exert  on  world  affairs,  and  will  act  to  strengthen  it  in  those  areas 
like-North-South that  are particularly suited  to  a  civil ian  power 
1 ike  the  E. C. 